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Non-technical Summary 
 
The empirical literature on the economics of patents employs a large array of patent-
based measures to proxy economic characteristics of patents such as the “science-
base”, “importance” or “value” of patented inventions. Although scholars have 
attempted to assess the validity of these proxies by relating them to e.g. inventor 
surveys, the appropriateness of these indicators is currently heavily debated.  
We contribute to this discussion by relating a group of obviously “wacky” patents to 
two control groups. If the patent-based indicators are appropriate, they should 
unambiguously identify the “wacky” patents.  
We present descriptive statistics and run probit regressions to evaluate the 
performance of commonly used patent-based measures. Our findings show that 
forward citations are good predictors of importance. However, the “wacky” patents 
have higher originality, generality and average citation lags than the controls, which 
suggests that these indicators should be interpreted carefully. At best, scholars should 
provide an external validation for their interpretation of patent-based measures. 
 
 
  
  
Das Wichtigste in Kürze (Summary in German) 
 
In der einschlägigen, empirischen Literatur wird eine Vielzahl von Patentindikatoren 
benutzt, um Charakteristika wie den Wissenschaftsbezug, die Relevanz, und den Wert 
von patentierten Erfindungen abzubilden. Trotz zahlreicher Versuche, diese Maße zu 
validieren, wie z.B. durch Erfinderbefragungen, wird die Qualität solcher Indikatoren 
momentan hitzig debattiert.  
Diese Studie stellt einen Beitrag zur aktuellen Diskussion dar. Wir vergleichen eine 
Gruppe von offensichtlich „skurrilen“ Patenten mit einer Kontrollgruppe regulärer 
Patente, um zu testen, ob die vielfach genutzten Patentindikatoren dazu in der Lage 
sind, zwischen beiden Gruppen von Patenten zu differenzieren.  
Wir evaluieren die Indikatoren anhand deskriptiver Statistiken und multivariater 
Probitmodellanalysen. Unsere Ergebnisse zeigen, dass Zitationen, die ein Patent von 
der späteren Patentliteratur erhält, ein oft genutzter Indikator für die Relevanz von 
Patenten, in der Lage ist, die „skurrilen“ Patente von der Kontrollgruppe zu 
unterscheiden. Für patent-basierte Indikatoren wie die Originalität, Generalität und die 
Zeitspanne bis zur ersten Zitation sind die Ergebnisse jedoch weniger 
zufriedenstellend. Würde man die Standardinterpretation wie in der existierenden der 
Literatur anwenden, müsste man schlussfolgern, dass die „skurrilen“ Patente 
wissenschaftsbasierter und komplexer sind als die Kontrollgruppe. Folglich schließen 
wir, dass patent-basierte Indikatoren mit größter Vorsicht ökonomisch interpretiert 
werden sollten. Im Idealfall sollte in jeder Studie eine externe Validierung der 
Indikatoren vorgenommen werden. 
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Abstract 
This study investigates whether standard patent measures for the importance 
and basicness of patents are able to distinguish between “wacky” patents 
and a control group of randomly drawn patents. Our findings show that 
forward citations are good predictors of importance. However, the “wacky” 
patents have higher originality, generality and average citation lags than the 
controls, which suggests that these indicators should be interpreted 
carefully. 
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1 Introduction  
The empirical literature on the economics of patents employs a large array of patent-
based measures to proxy economic characteristics such as “science-base”, 
“importance” or “value” of patented inventions. Although scholars have attempted to 
assess the validity of these proxies by relating them to e.g. inventor surveys, the 
appropriateness of these indicators is currently heavily debated (e.g. Gambardella et 
al., 2008, Gittelman, 2008, Alcacer and Gittelman, 2006, Harhoff et al., 2003). We 
contribute to this discussion by relating a group of “wacky” patents to two control 
groups. If the patent-based indicators are appropriate, they should unambiguously 
identify the “wacky” patents. We present descriptive statistics and run probit 
regressions to evaluate the performance of commonly used patent-based measures. 
2 Data and Variables 
2.1 Data and sample selection 
The analysis is based on patents downloaded from www.patentoftheweek.com. This 
website provides a list of “wacky” patents collected by an employee of the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). Patents classified as “wacky” were 
selected by the site author for their futile nature, as they do not involve a high 
inventive step or only marginally satisfy the “non-obviousness” criterion. One 
example is patent US4866863 for a religious device named “empty tomb”. Another 
example is patent US5078642 for a toy bar soap slide that can be attached to a bathtub 
for kids’ entertainment.1 
In total, 188 U.S. granted patents are listed on the webpage that have been applied for 
between 1974 and 2002. We construct two control groups. The first control group 
consists of five randomly drawn patents in the same application year and three-digit 
technology class for each “wacky” patent. The second control group contains five 
randomly drawn patents in the same six-digit technology class for each “wacky” 
patent. The second control group is constructed because the use of the three-digit 
technology classes may generate spurious matches (Thompson and Fox-Kean, 2005). 
                                                 
1 We invite the reader to look at the other patents on the website. For reasons of brevity we do not 
provide more examples of “wacky” patents. 
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As there are not always enough patents filed in the same six-digit technology class in 
the same application year, control patents were drawn from a three-year window 
around the application year of the focal patent. For five “wacky” patents, control 
patents had to be taken from an even broarder time window. In these cases, the patents 
that were closest to the application year of the focal patent were chosen. Finally, we 
dropped one “wacky” patent because there were not enough control patents available 
in the same six-digit technology class over all years. All patent related variables were 
drawn from the 2006 edition of the NBER Patent and Citation Database (Hall et al., 
2001). 
2.2 Variables 
We use the most commonly applied patent measures in the empirical innovation 
literature to test whether they are able to distinguish the “wacky” patents from the 
controls. 
Forward citations are defined as the number of all U.S. citations received by a focal 
patent from subsequent patents. This measure is typically interpreted as the 
“importance”, the “quality” or the “significance” of a patented invention. Previous 
studies have shown that forward citations are highly correlated with the social value 
(Trajtenberg, 1990) and the private value of the patented invention (Harhoff et al., 
1999, Hall et al., 2005). Furthermore, forward citations reflect the economic and 
technological “importance” as perceived by the inventors themselves (Jaffe et al., 
2000) and knowledgeable peers in the technology domain (Albert et al., 1991).  
Backward citations determine the legal boundaries of an invention by defining a 
related body of prior art. Empirical evidence shows a positive relationship between 
the number of backward citations and the patent value (Harhoff et al., 2003). The 
number of cited patent reflects the extent of patenting in a given technological area 
and therefore the profitability of the inventions in that domain.  
The citation lag: Patents covering more basic or fundamental technologies are often 
argued to be cited later than applied patents because it takes longer for basic 
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inventions to be understood and used by others (Sampat et al., 2003). We use the 
average citation lag to test for this.2 
Non-patent references (NPR): While the meaning of NPRs is not unambiguous, there 
is some recognition of their use as an indicator of science-technology linkages 
(Callaert et al., 2004, Meyer, 2000). Therefore, patents citing NPRs may reflect 
inventions resulting from fundamental research and are thus further away from market 
applications. 
Originality and Generality (Trajtenberg et al., 1997): Originality is defined as one 
minus the Hirschman-Herfindahl index of the cited 3-digit technology classes. Patents 
drawing from many different technology areas are presumably more original and 
more complex. Generality is defined as one minus the Hirschman-Herfindahl index of 
the citing 3-digit technology classes and is typically interpreted as a measure for the 
basicness of a technology: the more inventions in different fields a patented 
technology triggers the more basic it is. Both measures are adjusted for small number 
bias following Hall (2005). 
Technological distance is defined as suggested by Trajtenberg et al. (1997). They 
assign the values 0/.33/.66 if the citing and cited patents are in the same 3-/2-/1-digit 
technology class, respectively. The value one is assigned if citing and cited patent are 
in different 1-digit technology classes. The measure of technological distance is the 
average distance of all citing patents to the focal patent. This can be interpreted as a 
measure of basicness: the further away the follow-up patents the more basic and 
fundamental is the focal patent. 
We also control for 6 broad technology fields based on the classification of the 
“wacky” patents on the patent-of-the week website. We also realized that the “wacky” 
patents are frequently filed by individual applicants. Consequently, we generated a 
dummy variable indicating whether the applicant is an individual or not after drawing 
the control group. 
                                                 
2 The empirical findings do not change if we use the time until a patent receives the first citation as an 
alternative measure. 
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3 Empirical Results 
3.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for the sample of “wacky” patents and both 
control groups.  
A first interesting observation is that “wacky” patents receive forward citations. 
Further, most “wacky” patents are owned by individual applicants rather than 
corporations.3 The subsequent regression analysis includes a dummy controlling for 
this difference. Regarding the patent measures discussed in section 2.2, “wacky” 
patents score higher in terms of generality than the patents in both control groups. 
There is a significant difference in originality between “wacky” patents and the first 
control group. Section 3.2 tests whether this holds in a multivariate framework. 
 
                                                 
3 Note that also in the control groups the share of patents owned by individual applicants is high. 
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3.2 Probit regressions  
Table 2 features probit models where the dependent variable takes the value one if the 
patent is “wacky”. We show different estimation results: models I and II show the 
basic regressions for the two different control groups. Model III and IV show the 
same specifications, but self-citations are excluded from the forward citation based 
measures. The share of forward self-citations is used as an additional regressor in 
models III and IV.4 Table 3 shows the marginal effects. 
The regression results support the standard interpretation of forward citations. 
“Wacky” patents receive fewer citations indicating that they are less “important” than 
the controls. Note that the average probability of being a wacky patents amounts to 
1/6 (= 16.7%) in our sample. An additional forward citation decreases the likelihood 
of a patent being “wacky” by 0.4-0.7 percentage points, keeping all other variables at 
their mean. Increasing the number of forward citations by one standard deviation (i.e. 
14 citations), decreases the likelihood of a “wacky” patent by 5.6-9.8 percentage 
points.   
 However, “wacky” patents score higher on generality, originality and receive their 
citations later. If the generality of a patent increases by 0.10 the likelihood to be a 
“wacky” patent increases by 0.8-1.6 percentage points at the means of all other 
variables. A decrease in generality by one standard deviation (0.35) increases the 
likelihood of being “wacky” by 28-56 percentage points. The effects for originality 
have a similar magnitude. The usual interpretation to these measures suggests that 
“wacky” patents are more basic, fundamental and complex.  
The standard interpretation of the citation lag might be misleading as well. While this 
measure is usually interpreted as the degree of basicness, our results for the 
comparison of “wacky” patents and the first control group suggest that longer citation 
lags might simply identify older and/or slower-moving technologies (Hall and 
Trajtenberg, 2006). The results for control patents drawn from the same six-digit 
                                                 
4 All regressions include two dummy variables indicating if a patent receives less than two forward or 
backward citations respectively in order to control for the fact that the bias-adjusted measures for 
originality and generality are not defined for patents with less than two backward/forward citations. 
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technology class do not show any significant differences between “wacky” patents 
and controls with regard to the citation lag. 
The originality and generality measures rely heavily on the USPTO’s classification 
system and treat each patent class as roughly comparable in size and importance (Hall 
and Trajtenberg, 2006). This is unlikely to hold because some subclasses are more 
important than others and some subclasses refer to closely related technologies 
whereas others refer to more distant technologies. Control group I drawn at the three-
digit technology class level could be subject to such biases. Originality and generality 
for the “wacky” patents might be overestimated (relative to control group 1) as the 
citing and cited patents might come from closely related and/or less important 
technology classes.   
Control group II that contains control patents drawn from the same six-digit 
technology class is not subject to such biases. Still, differences between “wacky” 
patents and controls exist with regard to generality and originality. A likely 
explanation is that “wacky” patents combine distant technologies that should not be 
joined because the combination is trivial or useless and that “wacky” patents receive 
citations by other patents that propose combinations of technologies that have been 
rarely combined before.5 An example for a “wacky” patent that combines existing 
distant technologies is patent US6385796 a self-flushing urinal with an integrated 
gaming and reward system. This patent receives three citations by patents using 
similar technology combinations. Similarly, the patent US4866863 for a religious 
shrine receives citations by patents for other religious devices.  
An alternative explanation for the difference between “wacky” patents and controls 
with regard to generality and originality could be that the “wacky” patent applications 
are based on a sloppy search for prior art, and that “wacky” patents receive citations 
by patents filed with little efforts in prior art search.  
                                                 
5 Moir (2008) argues, for instance, that it is less likely that the patent office can reject a patent 
application that combines old ideas. 
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Table 2: Probit regression for being a “wacky” patent 
 I II III IV 
  
w/t self 
citationsA 
 w/t self 
citationsA 
 
control  
group I 
control  
group II 
control  
group I 
control  
group II 
 
coeff. 
(s.e.) 
coeff. 
(s.e.) 
coeff. 
(s.e.) 
coeff. 
(s.e.) 
forward citations -0.03*** -0.02*** -0.04*** -0.02*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
backward citations -0.01 -0.02* -0.01 -0.02* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
generality 0.71*** 0.43** 0.85*** 0.39** 
 (0.18) (0.17) (0.24) (0.17) 
originality 0.67*** 0.39** 0.69*** 0.38** 
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) 
average fwd. cit. lag 0.08*** 0.02 0.07*** 0.02 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
techn. distance -0.28 -0.07 -0.19 0.03 
 (0.29) (0.27) (0.28) (0.27) 
NPRs 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
individual applicant  0.87*** 0.86*** 0.86*** 0.89*** 
 (0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) 
share of fwd self-cit   -0.79* 0.24 
   (0.47) (0.42) 
less than 2 bwd cit 0.35** 0.30* 0.36** 0.29* 
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.18) (0.17) 
less than 2 fwd cit 0.60*** 0.12 0.54*** 0.16 
 (0.19) (0.18) (0.18) (0.17) 
constant -2.44*** -1.96*** -2.36*** -2.05*** 
 (0.50) (0.48) (0.49) (0.48) 
# 1,122 1,122 1,122 1,122 
Log-likelihood -417.43 -417.81 -418.78 -441.26 
6 application period dummies (each covering 4 years) and 5 technology field dummies are 
included in all regressions. 
A Self-citations are excluded for all measures based on fwd citations. Those are fwd citations, 
generality, average forward citation lag, technological distance, and time to first citation.  
*,**,*** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. 
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Table 3: Marginal effects 
 I II III IV 
  
w/t self  
citationsA w/t self citationsA 
 
control  
group I 
control  
group II 
control  
group I 
control  
group II 
 
coeff. 
(s.e.) 
coeff. 
(s.e.) 
coeff. 
(s.e.) 
coeff. 
(s.e.) 
forward citations -0.006*** -0.004*** -0.007*** -0.005*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.01) 
backward citations -0.002 -0.004* -0.002 -0.004** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
generality 0.136*** 0.089** 0.161*** 0.080** 
 (0.034) (0.036) (0.046) (0.035) 
originality 0.129*** 0.080** 0.131*** 0.079** 
 (0.032) (0.034) (0.032) (0.035) 
average fwd. cit. lag 0.015*** 0.005 0.014*** 0.005 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
techn. distance -0.054 -0.015 -0.035 0.007 
 (0055) (0.056) (0.002) (0.056) 
NPRs 0.002 -0.003 0.001 -0.003 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
individual applicant  0.160*** 0.173*** 0.157*** 0.177*** 
 (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021) 
share of fwd self-cit   -0.150 0.050 
   (0.088) (0.086) 
less than 2 bwd cit 0.074* 0.067 0.076* 0.065 
 (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) 
less than 2 fwd cit 0.143*** 0.026 0.124** 0.036 
 (0.054) (0.039) (0.049) (0.040) 
# 1,122 1,122 1,122 1,122 
6 application period dummies (each covering 4 years) and 5 technology field dummies are 
included in all regressions. 
A Self citations are excluded for all measures based on fwd citations. Those are fwd citations, 
generality, average forward citation lag, technological distance, and time to first citation.  
*,**,*** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. 
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4 Conclusion 
This paper tests whether the standard indicators for the importance and basicness of 
patents are able to distinguish between “wacky” patents and a control group. Our 
results show that if we would interpret the measures originality, generality and 
average citation lag as is common in the empirical literature we would have to 
conclude that our “wacky” patents are more basic, fundamental and complex. This 
shows that patent indicators should be interpreted with care. Alternative 
interpretations than those provided by prior research should be taken into account. At 
best, scholars should provide an external validation for their interpretation of patent-
based measures. 
Unfortunately, our results are not based on an exhaustive list of wacky patents so that 
it is not possible to make conclusion about the frequency of “wacky” patents, their 
distribution over technology classes or to identify the technology subclasses that 
contain most “wacky” patents. 
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